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Abstract
Starting with Gilmer et al. (2018), several works have demonstrated the inevitability
of adversarial examples based on different assumptions about the underlying input
probability space. It remains unclear, however, whether these results apply to
natural image distributions. In this work, we assume the underlying data distribution
is captured by some conditional generative model, and prove intrinsic robustness
bounds for a general class of classifiers, which solves an open problem in Fawzi
et al. (2018). Building upon the state-of-the-art conditional generative models,
we study the intrinsic robustness of two common image benchmarks under `2
perturbations, and show the existence of a large gap between the robustness limits
implied by our theory and the adversarial robustness achieved by current state-
of-the-art robust models. Code for all our experiments is available at https:
//github.com/xiaozhanguva/Intrinsic-Rob.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved remarkable performance on many visual (Sutskever
et al., 2012; He et al., 2016) and speech (Hinton et al., 2012) recognition tasks, but recent studies
have shown that state-of-the-art DNNs are surprisingly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations,
small imperceptible input transformations that are designed to switch the prediction of the classifier
(Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015). This has led to a vigorous arms race between heuristic
defenses (Papernot et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2018; Chakraborty et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2019) that
propose ways to defend against existing attacks and newly-devised attacks (Carlini and Wagner, 2017;
Athalye et al., 2018; Tramer et al., 2020) that are able to penetrate such defenses. Reliable defenses
appear to be elusive, despite progress on provable defenses, including formal verification (Katz et al.,
2017; Tjeng et al., 2019) and relaxation-based certification methods (Sinha et al., 2018; Raghunathan
et al., 2018; Wong and Kolter, 2018; Gowal et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2018). Even the strongest of
these defenses leave large opportunities for adversaries to find adversarial examples, while suffering
from high computation costs and scalability issues.
Witnessing the difficulties of constructing robust classifiers, a line of recent works (Gilmer et al.,
2018; Fawzi et al., 2018; Mahloujifar et al., 2019a; Shafahi et al., 2019) aims to understand the
limitations of robust learning by providing theoretical bounds on adversarial robustness for arbitrary
classifiers. By imposing different assumptions on the underlying data distributions and allowable
perturbations, all of these theoretical works show that no adversarially robust classifiers exist for an
assumed metric probability space, as long as the perturbation strength is sublinear in the typical norm
of the inputs. Although such impossibility results seem disheartening to the goal of building robust
classifiers, it remains unknown to what extent real image distributions satisfy the assumptions needed
to obtain these results.
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In this paper, we aim to bridge the gap between the theoretical robustness analyses on well-behaved
data distributions and the maximum achievable adversarial robustness, which we call intrinsic
robustness (formally defined by Definition 3.2), for typical image distributions. More specifically,
we assume the underlying data lie on a separable low-dimensional manifold, which can be captured
using a conditional generative model, then systematically study the intrinsic robustness based on
the conditional generating process from both theoretical and experimental perspectives. Our main
contributions are:
• We prove a fundamental bound on intrinsic robustness (Section 4), provided that the under-
lying data distribution can be captured by a conditional generative model, solving an open
problem in Fawzi et al. (2018).
• Building upon a trained conditional generative model that mimics the underlying data gener-
ating process, we empirically evaluate the intrinsic robustness on image distributions based
on MNIST and ImageNet (Section 5.2). Our estimates of intrinsic robustness demonstrate
that there is still a large gap between the limits implied by our theory and the state-of-the-art
robustness achieved by robust training methods (Section 5.3).
• We theoretically characterize the fundamental relationship between the in-distribution
adversarial risk (which restricts adversarial examples to lie on the image manifold, and is
formally defined by Definition 3.3) and the intrinsic robustness (Remark 4.6), and propose
an optimization method to search for in-distribution adversarial examples with respect to a
given classifier. Our estimated in-distribution robustness for state-of-the-art adversarially
trained classifiers, together with the derived intrinsic robustness bound, provide a better
understanding on the intrinsic robustness for natural image distributions (Section 5.4).
Notation. We use lower boldfaced letters such as x to denote vectors, and [n] to denote the index
set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For any x ∈ X and  ≥ 0, denote by B(x, ,∆) = {x′ ∈ X : ∆(x,x′) ≤ } the
-ball around x with radius  in some distance metric ∆. When the metric is free of context, we
simply write B(x, ) = B(x, ,∆). We use N (0, Id) to denote the d-dimensional standard Gaussian
distribution, and let νd be its probability measure. For the one dimensional case, we use Φ(x) to
denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of N (0, 1), and use Φ−1(x) to denote its inverse
function. For any function g : Z → X and probability measure ν defined over Z , g∗(ν) denotes the
push-forward measure of ν. The `2-norm of a vector x ∈ Rn is defined as ‖x‖2 = (
∑
i∈[n] x
2
i )
1/2.
2 Related Work
Several recent works (Gilmer et al., 2018; Mahloujifar et al., 2019a; Shafahi et al., 2019; Dohmatob,
2019; Bhagoji et al., 2019) derived theoretical bounds on maximum achievable adversarial robustness
using isoperimetric inequality under different assumptions of the input space. For instance, based on
the assumption that the input data are uniformly distributed over two concentric n-spheres (Gilmer
et al., 2018) or the underlying metric probability space satisfies a concentrated property (Mahloujifar
et al., 2019a), any classifier with constant test error was proven to be vulnerable to adversarial
perturbations sublinear to the input dimension. Shafahi et al. (2019) showed that adversarial examples
are inevitable, provided the maximum density of the underlying input distribution is small relative to
uniform density. However, none of the above theoretical works provide any experiments to justify
the imposed assumptions hold for real datasets, thus it is unclear whether the derived theoretical
bounds are meaningful for typical image distributions. Our work belongs to this line of research, but
encompasses the practical goal of understanding the robustness limits for real image distributions.
The most related literature to ours is Fawzi et al. (2018), which proved a classifier-independent upper
bound on intrinsic robustness, provided the underlying distribution is well captured by a smoothed
generative model with Gaussian latent space and small Lipschitz parameter. However, their proposed
theory cannot be applied to image distributions that lie on a low-dimensional, non-smooth manifold,
as their framework requires examples from different classes to be close enough in the latent space. In
contrast, our proposed theoretical bounds on intrinsic robustness are more general in that they can
be applied to non-smoothed data manifolds, such as image distributions generated by conditional
models. In addition, we propose an empirical method to estimate the intrinsic robustness on the
generated image distributions under worst-case `2 perturbations.
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Mahloujifar et al. (2019b) proposed to understand the inherent limitations of robust learning using
heuristic methods to measure the concentration of measure based on a given set of i.i.d. samples.
However, it is unclear to what extent the estimated sample-based concentration approximates the
actual intrinsic robustness with respect to the underlying data distribution. In comparison, we assume
the underlying data distribution can be captured by a conditional generative model and directly study
the robustness limit on the generated data distribution.
3 Preliminaries
We focus on the task of image classification. Let (X , µ,∆) be a metric probability space, where
X ⊆ Rn denotes the input space, µ is a probability distribution over X and ∆ is some distance
metric defined on X . Suppose there exists a ground-truth function, f∗ : X → [K], that gives a
label to any image x ∈ X , where [K] denotes the set of all possible class labels. The objective
of classification is to learn a function f : X → [K] that approximates f∗ well. In the context of
adversarial examples, f is typically evaluated based on risk, which captures the classification accuracy
of f on normal examples, and adversarial risk, which captures the classifier’s robustness against
adversarial perturbations:
Definition 3.1. Let (X , µ,∆) be a metric probability space and f∗ be the ground-truth classifier. For
any classifier f , the risk of f is defined as:
Riskµ(f) = Pr
x∼µ
[
f(x) 6= f∗(x)].
The adversarial risk of f against perturbations with strength  in metric ∆ is defined as:
AdvRiskµ(f) = Pr
x∼µ
[∃ x′ ∈ B(x, ) s.t. f(x′) 6= f∗(x′)].
Other definitions of adversarial risk also exist in literature, such as the definition used in Madry et al.
(2018) and the one proposed in Fawzi et al. (2018). However, these definitions are equivalent to each
other under the assumption that small perturbations do not change the ground-truth labels. Another
closely-related definition for adversarial robustness is the expected distance to the nearest error (see
Diochnos et al. (2018) for the relation between these definitions). Our results can be applied to this
definition as well.
Under different assumptions of the input metric probability space, previous works proved model-
independent bounds on adversarial robustness. Intrinsic robustness, defined originally by Mahloujifar
et al. (2019b), captures the maximum adversarial robustness that can be achieved for a given robust
learning problem:
Definition 3.2. Using the same settings as in Definition 3.1 and let F be some class of classifiers.
The intrinsic robustness with respect to F is defined as:
Robµ(F) = 1− inf
f∈F
{
AdvRiskµ(f)
}
.
In this work, we consider the class of imperfect classifiers that have risk at least some α > 0.
Motivated by the great success of producing natural-looking images using conditional generative
adversarial nets (GANs) (Mirza and Osindero, 2014; Odena et al., 2017; Brock et al., 2019), we
assume the underlying data distribution µ can be modeled by some conditional generative model. A
generative model can be seen as a function g : Z → X that maps some latent distribution, usually
assumed to be multivariate Gaussian, to some generated distribution over X .
Conditional generative models incorporate the additional class information into the data generating
process. A conditional generative model can be considered as a set of generative models {gi}i∈[K],
where images from the i-th class can be generated by transforming latent Gaussian vectors through
gi. More rigorously, we say a probability distribution µ can be generated by a conditional generative
model {(gi, pi)}i∈[K], if µ =
∑K
i=1 pi · (gi)∗(νd), where K is the total number of different class
labels, and pi ∈ [0, 1] represents the probability of sampling an image from class i.
Based on the conditional model, we introduce the definition of in-distribution adversarial risk:
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Definition 3.3. Consider the same settings as in Definition 3.1. Suppose µ can be captured by a con-
ditional generative model {(gi, pi)}i∈[K]. For any given classifier f , the in-distribution adversarial
risk of f against -perturbations is defined as:
In-AdvRiskµ(f) = Pr
(x,i)∼µ
[∃ z′ ∈ Z s.t. gi(z′) ∈ B(x, ) and f(gi(z′)) 6= f∗(gi(z′))].
Given the fact that the in-distribution adversarial risk restricts the adversarial examples to be on the
image manifold, it holds that, for any classifier f , In-AdvRiskµ(f) ≤ AdvRiskµ(f). As will be
shown in the next section, such a notion of in-distribution adversarial risk is closely related to the
intrinsic robustness for the considered class of imperfect classifiers.
4 Main Theoretical Results
In this section, we present our main theoretical results on intrinsic robustness, provided the underlying
distribution can be modeled by some conditional generative model (our results and proof techniques
could also be easily applied to unconditional generative models). Based on the underlying generative
process, the following local Lipschitz condition connects perturbations in the image space to the
latent space.
Condition 4.1. Let g : Rd → X be a generative model that maps the latent Gaussian distribution νd
to some generated distribution. Consider Euclidean distance as the distance metric for Rd, and ∆ as
the metric for X . Given r > 0, g is said to be L(r)-locally Lipschitz with probability at least 1− δ,
if it satisfies
Pr
z∼νd
[
∀z′ ∈ B(z, r), ∆(g(z′), g(z)) ≤ L(r) · ‖z′ − z‖2] ≥ 1− δ.
As the main tool for bounding the intrinsic robustness, we present the Gaussian Isoperimetric
inequality for the sake of completeness. This inequality, proved by Borell (1975) and Sudakov and
Tsirelson (1978), bounds the minimum expansion of any subset with respect to the standard Gaussian
measure.
Lemma 4.2 (Gaussian Isoperimetric Inequality). Consider metric probability space (Rd, νd, ‖ · ‖2),
where νd is the probability measure for d-dimensional standard Gaussian distribution N (0, Id), and
‖ · ‖2 denotes the Euclidean distance. For any subset E ⊆ Rd and r ≥ 0, let Er =
{
z ∈ Rd : ∃z′ ∈
E , s.t. ‖z − z′‖2 ≤ r
}
be the r-expansion of E , then it holds that
νd(Er) ≥ Φ
(
Φ−1
(
νd(E)
)
+ r
)
, (4.1)
where Φ(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞ exp(−u2/2)du is the CDF of N (0, 1), and Φ−1(x) denotes its inverse.
In particular, when E belongs to the set of half-spaces, the equality is achieved in (4.1).
Making use of the Gaussian Isoperimetric Inequality and the local Lipschitz condition of the con-
ditional generator, the following theorem proves a lower bound on the (in-distribution) adversarial
risk for any given classifier, provided the underlying distribution can be captured by a conditional
generative model.
Theorem 4.3. Let (X , µ,∆) be a metric probability space and f∗ : X → [K] be the underlying
ground-truth. Suppose µ can be generated by a conditional generative model {(gi, pi)}i∈[K]. Given
 > 0, suppose there exist constants r > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1] such that for any i ∈ [K], gi satisfies
Li(r)-local Lipschitz property with probability at least 1−δ and r ·Li(r) ≥ . Then for any classifier
f , it holds that
AdvRiskµ(f) ≥ In-AdvRiskµ(f) ≥
K∑
i=1
pi · Φ
(
Φ−1
(
Riskµi(f)
)
+

Li(r)
)
− δ,
where µi = (gi)∗(νd) is the pushforward measure of νd though gi, for any i ∈ [K].
We provide a proof in Appendix A.1. Theorem 4.3 suggests the (in-distribution) adversarial risk
is related to the risk on each data manifold and the ratio between the perturbation strength and the
Lipschitz constant.
The following theorem, proved in Appendix A.2, gives a theoretical upper bound on the intrinsic
robustness with respect to the class of imperfect classifiers.
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Theorem 4.4. Under the same setting as in Theorem 4.3, let Lmax(r) = maxi∈[K] Li(r). Consider
the class of imperfect classifiers Fα = {f : Riskµ(f) ≥ α} with α > 0, then the intrinsic robustness
with respect to Fα can be bounded as,
Robµ(Fα) ≤ 1 + δ − min
i∈[K]
{
pi · Φ
(
Φ−1
(
α
pi
)
+

Lmax(r)
)}
,
provided that α/pi ≤ 1 for any i ∈ [K]. In addition, if we consider the family of classifiers that have
conditional risk at least α for each class, namely F˜α = {f : Riskµi(f) ≥ α,∀i ∈ [K]}, then the
intrinsic robustness with respect to F˜α can be bounded by
Robµ(F˜α) ≤ 1 + δ −
K∑
i=1
pi · Φ
(
Φ−1
(
α
)
+

Lmax(r)
)
.
Remark 4.5. Theorem 4.4 shows that if the data distribution can be captured by a conditional
generative model, the intrinsic robustness bound with respect to imperfect classifiers will largely
depend on the ratio /Lmax. For instance, if we assume the ratio /Lmax = 1, then Theorem 4.4
suggests that no classifier with initial risk at least 5% can achieve robust accuracy exceeding 75%
for the assumed data generating process. In addition, if we assume the local Lipschitz parameter
Lmax is some constant, then adversarial robustness is indeed not achievable for high-dimensional
data distributions, provided the perturbation strength  is sublinear to the input dimension, which is
the typical setting considered.
Remark 4.6. The intrinsic robustness is closely related to the in-distribution adversarial risk. For
the class of classifiers Fα, one can prove that the intrinsic robustness is equivalent to the maximum
achievable in-distribution adversarial robustness:
Robµ(Fα) = 1− inf
f∈Fα
{In-AdvRiskµ(f)}. (4.2)
Trivially, AdvRiskµ(f) ≥ In-AdvRiskµ(f) holds for any f . For a given f ∈ Fα, one can construct
an hf ∈ Fα such that hf (x) = f(x) if x ∈ Ef ∩ M and hf (x) = f∗(x) otherwise, where
Ef = {x ∈ X : f(x) 6= f∗(x)} denotes the error region of f and M is the considered image
manifold. The construction immediately suggests In-AdvRiskµ(f) = AdvRisk

µ(hf ), which implies,
inf
f∈Fα
{In-AdvRiskµ(f)} = inf
f∈Fα
{AdvRiskµ(hf )} ≥ inf
f∈Fα
{AdvRiskµ(f)}.
Combining both directions proves the soundness of (4.2). This equivalence suggests the in-distribution
adversarial robustness of any classifier in Fα can be viewed as a lower bound on the actual intrinsic
robustness, which motivates us to study the intrinsic robustness by estimating the in-distribution
adversarial robustness of trained robust models in our experiments.
5 Experiments
This section provides our empirical evaluations of the intrinsic robustness on real image distributions
to evaluate the tightness of our bound. We test our bound on two image distributions generated using
MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) and ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) datasets.
5.1 Conditional GAN Models
Instead of directly evaluating the robustness on real datasets, we make use of conditional GAN models
to generate datasets from the learned data distributions and evaluate the robustness of several state-
of-the-art robust models trained on the generated dataset for a fair comparison with the theoretical
robustness limits. Note that this approach is only feasible with conditional generative models as
unconditional models cannot provide the corresponding labels for the generated data samples. For
MNIST, we adopt ACGAN (Odena et al., 2017) which features an additional auxiliary classifier
for better conditional image generation. The ACGAN model generates 28 × 28 images from a
100-dimension latent space concatenated with an addition 10-dimension one-hot encoding of the
conditional class labels. For ImageNet, we adopt the BigGAN model (Brock et al., 2019) which
is the state-of-the-art GAN model in conditional image generation. It generates 128× 128 images
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(a) ACGAN Generated MNIST (b) BigGAN Generated ImageNet
Figure 1: Illustration of the generated images using different conditional models. For BigGAN
generated images, we select 10 specific classes from the 1000 ImageNet classes (corresponding to
the 10 image classes in CIFAR-10).
from a 120-dimension latent space. We down-sampled the generated images to 32× 32 for efficiency
propose. We consider a standard Gaussian2 as the latent distribution for both conditional generative
models. Figure 1 shows examples of the generated MNIST and ImageNet images. For both figures,
each column of images corresponds to a particular label class of the considered dataset.
5.2 Local Lipschitz Constant Estimation
From Theorem 4.4, we observe that given a class of classifiers with risk at least α, the derived intrinsic
robustness upper bound is mainly decided by the perturbation strength  and the local Lipschitz
constant L(r). While  is usually predesignated in common robustness evaluation settings, the local
Lipschitz constant L(r) is unknown for most real world tasks. Computing an exact Lipschitz constant
of a deep neural network is a difficult open problem. Thus, instead of obtaining the exact value, we
approximate L(r) using a sample-based approach with respect to the generative models.
Recalling Definition 4.1, we consider ∆ as the `2 distance and g(z) and g(z′) are easy to compute via
the generator network. Computing L(r), however, is much more complicated as it requires obtaining
a maximum value within a radius-r ball. To deal with this, our approach approximates L(r) by
sampling N points in the neighborhood around z and takes the maximum value as the estimation
of the true maximum value within the ball. Since the definition of local Lipschitz is probabilistic,
we take multiple samples of the latent vectors z to estimate the local Lipschitz constant L(r). The
estimation procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1, which gives an underestimate of the underlying
truth. Developing better Lipschitz estimation methods is an active area in machine learning research,
but is not the main focus of this work.
Algorithm 1 Local Lipschitz Estimation
Input: number of samples S, number of local neighbors per sample N , r, δ
for i = 1, . . . , S do
Generate a latent space sample zi
Generate N samples {ẑji }Nj=1 within Br(zi)
Li = maxj
‖g(ẑji )−g(zi)‖2
‖ẑji−zi‖2
end for
Output: (1− δ)-percentile of {Li}Si=1
2The original BigGAN model uses truncated Gaussian. We adapted it to standard Gaussian distribution.
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Table 1: The estimated local Lipschitz constants of the trained ACGAN model on the 10 MNIST
classes with r = 0.5 and δ = 0.001.
Class digit 0 digit 1 digit 2 digit 3 digit 4
Lipschitz 7.9± 0.3 8.6± 0.4 8.3± 0.4 7.8± 0.3 10.3± 0.6
Class digit 5 digit 6 digit 7 digit 8 digit 9
Lipschitz 11.0± 0.4 9.5± 0.3 7.8± 0.2 9.3± 0.4 10.9± 0.4
Table 2: The estimated local Lipschitz constants of the BigGAN model on the 10 selected ImageNet
classes with r = 0.5 and δ = 0.001.
Class airliner jeep goldfinch tabby cat hartebeest
Lipschitz 13.1± 0.8 14.5± 1.1 11.7± 0.5 12.4± 0.4 10.4± 1.1
Class Maltese dog bullfrog sorrel pirate ship pickup
Lipschitz 11.3± 0.6 9.4± 0.3 13.0± 0.3 13.1± 0.8 14.9± 0.9
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the local Lipschitz constants estimated for the trained ACGAN and
BigGAN generators conditioned on each class. In particular, we report both the mean estimates
averaged over 10 repeated trials and the standard deviations. For both conditional generators, we set
S = 1000, N = 2000, r = 0.5 and δ = 0.001 in Algorithm 1 for Lipschitz estimation. For BigGAN,
the specifically selected 10 classes from ImageNet are reported in Table 2.
Compared with unconditional generative models, conditional ones generate each class using a separate
generator. Thus, the local Lipschitz constant of each class-conditioned generator is expected to be
smaller than that of unconditional ones, as the within-class variation is usually much smaller than the
between-class variation for a given classification dataset. For instance, we trained an unconditional
GAN generator (Goodfellow et al., 2014) on MNIST dataset, which yields an overall local Lipschitz
constant of 27.01 from Algorithm 1 under the same parameter settings. If we plug in this estimated
Lipschitz constant into the theoretical results in Fawzi et al. (2018), the implied intrinsic robustness
bound is in fact vacuous (above 1) with perturbations strength  ≤ 3.0 in `2 distance.
5.3 Comparisons with Robust Classifiers
We compare our derived intrinsic robustness upper bound with the empirical adversarial robustness
achieved by the current state-of-the-art defense methods under `2 perturbations. Specifically, we
consider three robust training methods: LP-Certify: optimization-based certified robust defense
(Wong et al., 2018); Adv-Train: PGD attack based adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018); and
TRADES: adversarial training by accuracy and robustness trade-off (Zhang et al., 2019). We adopt
these robust training methods to train robust classifiers over a set of generated training images and
evaluate their robustness on the corresponding generated test set.
For MNIST, we use our trained ACGAN model to generate 10 classes of hand-written digits with
60, 000 training images and 10, 000 testing images. For ImageNet, we use the BigGAN model to
generate 10 selected classes of images, which contains 50, 000 images for training set and 10, 000
images for test set. We refer to the 10-class BigGAN generated dataset as ‘ImageNet10’. We set
 = 3.0 for training robust models using Adv-Train and TRADES for both generated datasets,
whereas we only train the LP-based certified robust classifier with  = 2.0 on generated MNIST data,
as it is not able to scale with ImageNet10 as well as generated MNIST with larger  (see Appendix
B.1 for all the selected hyper-parameters and network architectures).
A commonly-used method to evaluate the robustness of a given model is by performing carefully-
designed adversarial attacks. Here we adopt the PGD attack (Madry et al., 2018), and report the
robust accuracy (classification accuracy on inputs generated using the PGD attack) as the empirically
measured model robustness. We test both the natural classification accuracy and the robustness of the
aforementioned adversarially trained classifiers under `2 perturbations with perturbation strength 
selected from {1.0, 2.0, 3.0}. See Appendix B.1 for PGD parameter settings.
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Table 3: Comparisons between the empirically measured robustness of adversarially trained classifiers
and the implied theoretical intrinsic robustness bound on the conditional generated datasets.
Dataset Method Natural Accuracy
Adversarial Robustness
 = 1.0  = 2.0  = 3.0
Generated
MNIST
LP-Certify 88.3± 0.2% 74.0± 0.4% 51.1± 0.6% 23.5± 0.3%
Adv-Train 97.2± 0.2% 93.1± 0.2% 83.5± 0.3% 58.9± 0.4%
TRADES 98.3± 0.1% 94.8± 0.2% 81.8± 0.4% 57.7± 0.4%
Our Bound - 98.2% 97.8% 97.2%
ImageNet10
Adv-Train 82.1± 0.3% 67.8± 0.3% 47.1± 0.4% 23.4± 0.4%
TRADES 83.4± 0.3% 68.5± 0.3% 49.1± 0.5% 27.8± 0.5%
Our Bound - 83.5% 81.8% 80.0%
Table 3 compares the empirically measured robustness of the trained robust classifiers and the derived
theoretical upper bound on intrinsic robustness. For empirically measured adversarial robustness, we
report both the mean and the standard deviation with respect to 10 repeated trials. For computing our
theoretical robust bounds, we plug the estimated local Lipschitz constants into Theorem 4.4 with risk
threshold α = 0.015 for generated MNIST and α = 0.15 for ImageNet10, to reflect the best natural
accuracy achieved by the considered robust classifiers.
Under most settings, there exists a large gap between the robust limit implied by our theory and the
best adversarial robustness achieved by state-of-the-art robust classifiers. For instance, Adv-Train
and TRADES only achieve less than 50% robust accuracy on the generated ImageNet10 data with
 = 2.0, whereas the estimated robustness bound is as high as 81.8%. The gap becomes even larger
when we increase the perturbation strength . In contrast to the previous theoretical results on artificial
distributions, for these image classification problems we cannot simply conclude from the intrinsic
robustness bound that adversarial examples are inevitable. This huge gap between the empirical
robustness of the best current image classifiers and the estimated theoretical bound suggests that
either there is a way to train better robust models or that there exist other explanations for the inherent
limitations of robust learning against adversarial examples.
5.4 In-distribution Adversarial Robustness
In Section 5.3, we empirically show the unconstrained robustness of existing robust classifiers is far
below the intrinsic robustness upper bound implied by our theory for real distributions. However, it
is not clear whether the reason is that current robust training methods are far from perfect, or that
our derived upper bound is not tight enough due to the Lipschitz relaxation step used for proving
such bound. In this section, we empirically study the in-distribution adversarial risk for a better
characterization of the actual intrinsic robustness. As shown in Remark 4.6, the in-distribution
adversarial robustness of any classifier with risk at least α can be regarded as a lower bound for the
intrinsic robustness Robµ(Fα). This provides us a more accurate characterization of the intrinsic
robustness bound and enables better understanding of intrinsic robustness.
While there are many types of attack algorithms in the literature that can be used to evaluate the
unconstrained robustness of a given classifier in the image space, little has been done in terms of
how to evaluate the in-distribution robustness. In order to empirically evaluate the in-distribution
robustness, we straightforwardly formulate the following optimization problem to find adversarial
examples on the image manifold:
min
z
L(f(G(z, y)), y) s.t. ‖G(z, y)− x‖2 ≤ , (5.1)
where z ∈ Rd, x is the data sample in the image space to be attacked, f is the given classifier, and
L denotes the adversarial loss function. The goal of (5.1) is to optimize the latent vector to lower
the adversarial loss (make the robust classifier mis-classify some generated images) while keeping
the distance between the generated image and the test image within  perturbation limit. The key
difficulty in solving (5.1) lies in the fact that we cannot perform any type of projection operations as
we are optimizing over z but the constraints are imposed on the generated image space G(z, y). This
prohibits the use of common attack algorithms such as PGD. In order to solve (5.1), we transform
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Figure 2: Comparisons between the theoretical intrinsic robustness bound and the empirically
estimated unconstrained/in-distribution adversarial robustness, denoted as “unc” and “in” in the
legend, of models produced during robust training on the generated data under `2. In each subfigure,
the dotted curve line represents the theoretical bound on intrinsic robustness with horizontal axis
denoting the different choice of α.
(5.1) into the following Lagrangian formulation:
min
z
‖G(z, y)− x‖2 + λ · L(f(G(z, y)), y). (5.2)
This formulation ignores the perturbation constraint of  and tries to find the in-distribution adversarial
examples with the smallest possible perturbation. In order to evaluate the intrinsic robustness under a
given  perturbation budget, we need to further check all in-distribution adversarial examples found
and only count those with perturbations within the  constraint. Note that even though (5.2) provides
us a feasible way to compute the in-distribution robustness of a classifier, equation (5.2) itself could
be hard to solve in general. First, it is not obvious how to initialize z. Random initialization of z
could lead to bad local optima which prevent the optimizer from efficiently solving (5.2) or even
finding a z that could make G(z, y) close enough to x. Second, the hyper-parameter λ could be quite
sensitive to different test examples. Failing to choose a proper λ could also lead to failures in finding
in-distribution adversarial examples within  constraint. In order to the tackle the aforementioned
challenges, we propose to solve another optimization problem for the initialization of z and adopt
binary search for the best choice of λ (see Appendix B.2 for more details of our implementation).
Figure 2 summarizes results from our empirical evaluations on intrinsic robustness of the generated
MNIST and ImageNet10 data. We evaluate the empirical robustness of three types of robust training
methods at different time points during the training procedure. To be more specific, we evaluate
the robustness of the intermediate models produced every 5 training epochs. For each method, we
plot both the unconstrained robustness measured by PGD attacks and the in-distribution robustness
measured using the aforementioned strategies. In addition, based on the local Lipschitz constants
estimated in Section 5.2, we plot the implied theoretical bound on intrinsic robustness as the dotted
line curve for direct comparison.
Compared with the intrinsic robustness upper bound (dotted curve line), the unconstrained robustness
of various robustly-trained models is much smaller, and the gap between them becomes more obvious
as we increase . This aligns with our observations in Section 5.3. However under all the considered
settings, the estimated in-distribution adversarial robustness is much higher than the unconstrained one
and closer to the theoretical upper bound, especially for the ImageNet10 data. Note that according
to Remark 4.6, the actual intrinsic robustness Robµ(Fα) should lie between the in-distribution
robustness of any given classifier with risk at least α and the derived intrinsic robustness upper bound.
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Observing the big gap between the estimated in-distribution and unconstrained robustness of various
robustly trained models, one would expect the current state-of-the-art robust models are still far from
approaching the actual intrinsic robustness limit for real image distributions.
6 Conclusions
We studied the intrinsic robustness of typical image distributions using conditional generative models.
By deriving theoretical upper bounds on intrinsic robustness and providing empirical estimates on
the generated image distributions, we observed a large gap between the theoretical intrinsic robust
limit and the best robustness achieved by state-of-the-art robust classifiers. Our results imply that the
inevitability of adversarial examples claimed in recent theoretical studies, such as Fawzi et al. (2018),
do not apply to real image distributions, and suggest that there is a need for deeper understanding on
the intrinsic robustness limitations for real data distributions.
A Proof of Main Theorem
This section presents the detailed proofs of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 in Section 4.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof. Let E = {x ∈ X : f(x) 6= f∗(x)} be the error region in the image space and E = {x ∈ X :
∆(x, E) ≤ } be the -expansion of E in metric ∆. By Definition 3.1, we have
AdvRiskµ(f) = µ(E) =
K∑
i=1
pi · µi(E) =
K∑
i=1
pi · AdvRiskµi(f).
Since according to Definition 3.3, we have AdvRiskµi(f) ≥ In-AdvRiskµi(f) for any i ∈ [K]. Thus,
it remains to lower bound each term In-AdvRiskµi(f) individually. For any classifier f , we have
In-AdvRiskµi(f) = Prz∼νd
[
∃ z′ ∈ Rd, s.t. ∆(gi(z′), gi(z)) ≤  and f(gi(z′)) 6= f∗(gi(z′))]
≥ Pr
z∼νd
[
∃ z′ ∈ B(z, /Li(r)), s.t. f(gi(z′)) 6= f∗(gi(z′))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
−δ (A.1)
where the first inequality is due to µi = (gi)∗(νd), and the second inequality holds because gi is
Li(r)-locally Lipschitz with probability at least 1− δ and B
(
z, /Li(r)
) ⊆ B(z, r) for any z ∈ Rd.
To further bound the term I , we make use of the Gaussian Isoperimetric Inequality as presented in
Lemma 4.2. Let Af = {z ∈ Rd : f(gi(z)) 6= f∗(gi(z))} be the corresponding error region in the
latent space. By Lemma 4.2, we have
I ≥ Φ
(
Φ−1
(
νd(Af )
)
+

Li(r)
)
= Φ
(
Φ−1
(
Riskµi(f)
)
+

Li(r)
)
. (A.2)
Finally, plugging (A.2) into (A.1), we complete the proof.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Proof. According to Definition 3.2 and Theorem 4.3, for any f ∈ Fα, we have
Robµ(Fα) ≤ 1 + δ −
K∑
i=1
pi · Φ
(
Φ−1
(
Riskµi(f)
)
+

Li(r)
)
≤ 1 + δ −
K∑
i=1
pi · Φ
(
Φ−1
(
Riskµi(f)
)
+

Lmax(r)
)
, (A.3)
where the last inequality holds because Φ(·) is monotonically increasing. For any f ∈ Fα, let
E = {x ∈ X : f(x) 6= f∗(x)} be the error region and αi = µi(E) be the measure of E under the
i-th conditional distribution.
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Thus, to obtain an upper bound on Robµ(Fα) using (A.3), it remains to solve the following optimiza-
tion problem:
minimize
α1,...,αK∈[0,1]
K∑
i=1
pi · Φ
(
Φ−1(αi) +

Lmax(r)
)
subject to
K∑
i=1
piαi ≥ α. (A.4)
Note that for classifier in F˜α, by definition, we can simply replace αi = α in (A.4), which proves the
upper bound on Robµ(F˜α).
Next, we are going to show that the optimal value of (A.4) is achieved, only if there exists a class
i′ ∈ [K] such that αi′ = α/pi′ and αi = 0 for any i 6= i′. Consider the simplest case where
K = 2. Note that Φ(·) and Φ−1(·) are both monotonically increasing functions, which implies that∑K
i=1 piαi = α holds when optimum achieved, thus the optimization problem for K = 2 can be
formulated as follows
min
α1,α2∈[0,1]
p1 · Φ
(
Φ−1(α1) +

Lmax(r)
)
+ p2 · Φ
(
Φ−1(α2) +

Lmax(r)
)
s.t. p1α1 + p2α2 = α.
(A.5)
Suppose α1 ≥ α2 holds for the initial setting. Now consider another setting where α′1 > α1, α′2 < α2.
Let s1 = Φ−1(α′1)− Φ−1(α1) and s2 = Φ−1(α2)− Φ−1(α′2). According to the equality constraint
of the optimization problem (A.5), we have
p1 ·
∫ Φ−1(α1)+s1
Φ−1(α1)
1√
2pi
· exp−x2/2 dx = p2 ·
∫ Φ−1(α2)
Φ−1(α2)−s2
1√
2pi
· exp−x2/2 dx. (A.6)
Let η = /Lmax(r) for simplicity. By simple algebra, we have
p1 ·
∫ Φ−1(α1)+s1+η
Φ−1(α1)+η
1√
2pi
· exp−x2/2 dx = p1 ·
∫ Φ−1(α1)+s1
Φ−1(α1)
1√
2pi
· exp−u2/2−η·u−η2/2 du
< p1 · exp−η·Φ−1(α1)−η2/2 ·
∫ Φ−1(α1)+s1
Φ−1(α1)
1√
2pi
· exp−u2/2 du
≤ p2 · exp−η·Φ−1(α2)−η2/2 ·
∫ Φ−1(α2)
Φ−1(α2)−s2
1√
2pi
· exp−u2/2 du
< p2 ·
∫ Φ−1(α2)+η
Φ−1(α2)−s2+η
1√
2pi
· exp−x2/2 dx,
where the first inequality holds because exp−η·u < exp−η·Φ
−1(α1) for any u > Φ−1(α1), the second
inequality follows from (A.6) and the fact that Φ−1(α1) ≥ Φ−1(α2), and the last inequality holds
because exp−η·Φ
−1(α2) < exp−η·u for any u < Φ−1(α2). Therefore, the optimal value of (A.5)
will be achieved when α1 = 0 or α2 = 0. For general setting with K > 2, since α1, . . . , αK are
independent in the objective, we can fix α3, . . . , αK and optimize α1 and α2 first, then deal with αi
incrementally using the same technique.
B Experimental Details
This section provides additional details for our experiments.
B.1 Network Architectures and Hyper-parameter Settings
For the certified robust defense (LP-Certify), we adopt the the same four-layer neural network
architecture as implemented in Wong et al. (2018), with two convolutional layers and two fully
connected layers, and use the an Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.001 and batch size 50 for
training the robust classifier. In particular, the adversarial loss function is based on the robust
certificate under `2 proposed in Wong et al. (2018).
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For training attack-based robust models (Adv-Train and TRADES), we use a seven-layer CNN
architecture which contains four convolution layers and three fully connected layers. We use a
SGD optimizer to minimize the attack-based adversarial loss with learning rate 0.05 on MNIST and
learning rate 0.01 on ImageNet10. Table 4 summarizes all the hyper-parameters we used for training
the robust models (β is an additional parameter specifically used in TRADES).
For evaluating the unconstrained adversarial robustness, we implemented PGD attack with `2 metric.
Table 5 shows all the hyper-parameters we used for robustness evaluation.
Table 4: Hyper-parameters used for training robust models.
Para. Generated MNIST ImageNet10
LP-Certified Adv Training TRADES Adv Training TRADES
 (in `2) 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
optimizer ADAM SGD SGD SGD SGD
learning rate 0.001 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01
#epochs 60 100 100 100 100
attack step size - 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
#attack steps - 40 40 10 10
β - - 6.0 - 6.0
Table 5: Hyper-parameters used for evaluating the model robustness via PGD attack.
Para. Generated MNIST ImageNet10
 = 1.0  = 2.0  = 3.0  = 1.0  = 2.0  = 3.0
attack step size 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5
#attack steps 100 100 100 100 100 100
B.2 Strategies for Estimating In-distribution Adversarial Robustness
Initialization of z: For MNIST data, we design an initialization strategy for z in order to make sure
the perturbation term ‖G(z, y)−x‖2 can be efficiently optimized. To be more specific, starting from
random noise, we first solve another optimization problem:
zinit = argmin
z
‖G(z, y)− x‖2.
By setting zinit as our initial point, we minimize the initial perturbation distance. Here z can start
from any random initial point as we will then optimize the generated image under `2 distance.
For ImageNet10 data, even applying the above optimization procedure doesn’t result in an initial z
such that ‖G(z, y)− x‖2 ≤  when  is small. Therefore, we use another strategy by recording the
z∗ when generating the test sample x, i.e., G(z∗, y) = x. And we adopt z∗ as the initial point for z
in solving (5.2). This makes sure that the whole optimization procedure could at least find one point
satisfying the perturbation constraint3.
The choice of λ: Inspired by Carlini and Wagner (2017), we also adopt binary search strategy for
finding better regularization parameter λ. Specifically, we set initial λ = 1.0 and if we successfully
find an adversarial example, we lower the value of λ via binary search. Otherwise, we raise the
value of λ. For each batch of examples, we perform 5 times binary search in order to find qualified
in-distribution adversarial examples.
Hyper-parameters: We use Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.01 for finding in-distribution
adversarial examples. We set maximum iterations for each λ binary search as 10000.
3We didn’t use z∗ as the initialization for MNIST data as our empirical study shows that the optimization-
based initialization achieves better performances on MNIST.
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